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Sherman Purchased 24th Street in 2006 Without Actual or Record Notice 
of the Cloud on Title or the Encroachment and Received all lndicia of 
Ownership. 
Global has alleged that Sherman is not a bona fide purchaser for value 
with regard to 24th Street in 2006 because of a cloud on title. Respondents Brief 
pp. 17-18. Sherman alleges that for all equitable claims it should be treated as 
such despite the cloud on title. While it is true that one "who purchases land 
expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is 
burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement." 
Halvorson v. N. Latah Cnty. Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 196, 205 (2011) ( quoting 
Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301 (2005)). Also, to be 
considered a bona fide purchaser, a party must show that at the time of the 
purchase he paid a valuable consideration and upon the belief and the validity of 
the vendor's claim of title without notice, actual or constructive, of any 
outstanding adverse rights of another. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 859 
(2010). The most important characteristic is that a bona fide purchaser for value 
has neither actual nor constructive notice of the cloud on title. Trunnell v. Ferge/, 
153 Idaho 68 (2012); Jahnke v. Mesa Equipment, Inc., 128 Idaho 562 (Ct. App. 
1996). In 2006, the record is clear that neither Sherman nor the public had any 
actual or constructive notice of the encroachment since all of Sprint's and 
Global's public filings occurred only on Lot 4 consistent with the legal description 
found in the PCS Site Agreement. 
REPLY BRIEF - 1 
In 2006, Sherman satisfied all elements to be considered a bona fide 
purchase for value despite the trial court's later ruling that its prior Judgment was 
a cloud on title. 
2. Sherman Received all lndicia of Title in 2006. 
The law of Idaho is that when an owner of property furnishes another party 
with indicia of title and that party purports to convey to an innocent third party 
purchaser for value, the original owner is estopped from asserting title to the 
property as against the third party bona fide purchaser. Nixon v. Johnson, 90 
Idaho 239 (1965); Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551 (1963). Ralls v. Fouraker, 
109 Idaho 488,492 (Idaho 1985). 
Sherman purchased the self-storage and car wash businesses in May, 
2006. The evidence shows that it was intended that Sherman purchase the 
totality of the property owned by the predecessor in interest. Upon the resolution 
of the ·litigation regarding 24th Street (companion case CV03-7690), Sherman 
received the quitclaim deed for 24th Street. No additional documentation or 
consideration was paid. This should be treated concurrently as one purchase 
since that was the intent of the granter. In 2006, Sherman received all indicia of 
ownership, paid taxes, and assumed all management and control over the 
property. When Sherman filed its initial Complaint for ejectment, it still was 
without notice of any cloud on title. From the beginning, Sherman's hands were 
clean. 
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3. Sherman had no Actual or Constructive Notice. 
"One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims 
does not take ,in good faith, and one who fails to investigate the open or obvious 
inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 
220 (1974). Wood v. Simonson, 108 Idaho 699, 703 (Ct. App. 1985); Imig v. 
McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318 (1955); Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho at 220, 526 
P.2d 180 (emphasis added). (one cannot be a good faith purchaser when a 
reasonable investigation of the property would have revealed the existence of the 
cloud on title). Id. at 220-21. In this case, Sherman did not purchase the property 
with actual or constructive notice of any encroachment or cloud on title on 24th 
Street. At that time any prudent investigation of the property or title search would 
not have shown any cloud on title. Ex. 28 and 29. This is because Sprint and 
Global purposefully avoided recording any documents that included 24th Street. 
At that time, there was no record notice or constructive notice of the PCS Site 
Agreement to· Sherman or the public. (See Sherman's full analysis highlighting 
the failure of Sprint and Global to provide record notice to the owners of 24th 
Street by its multiple filings from 2001 to 2006 at Appellant's Brief, pp. 25-29) 
4. The Shelter Rule Applies to Protect Sherman. 
Even for arguments sake, if Sherman was not a bona fide purchaser in 
2006, it received the property from a bona fide purchaser and would be sheltered 
in their protective status. The "Shelter Rule" provides that one who is not a bona 
fide purchaser, but who takes an interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, 
may be sheltered in the latter's protective status. Siegel Mobile Home Group, Inc. 
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v. Bowen, 114 Idaho 531 (Ct.App.1988) citing Johnson v. Casper, 75 Idaho 256 
(1954). A bona fide purchaser can transfer good title to a person who has notice 
of a prior adverse equity or right. Siegel at 531. 
There are two exceptions to the Shelter Rule that are inapplicable to 
Sherman: (1) where the interest held by a bona fide purchaser was obtained from 
a granter with notice of an outstanding interest in the property, and the property 
is reconveyed. to the granter; and (2) when the property is reconveyed from a 
bona fide purchaser to a person guilty of a violation of a trust or duty with respect 
to the property. Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, Idaho 862 (Ct. App. 
1993). The exceptions clearly do not apply to Sherman in this case. 
5. Sherman Filed a Correction Deed that Relates Back to 2006. 
Global tried to raise the issue of quieting title to 24th Street. Neither 
Sherman nor The Wallace Family Trust questioned title. Only Global filed a 
motion to quiet title. However, before the trial court could rule on any quiet title 
issue, The Wallace Family Trust and Sherman filed the correction deed in 2010. 
Those were the only two parties with standing to object to Sherman's ownership. 
The trial court never issued an order to quiet title, and the issue became moot by 
the execution and recording of the correction deed. 
The doctrine of relation back permits a party to a conveyance of real 
property to correct an error in the original deed by filing a subsequent or 
"correction" deed. The correction then becomes effective as of the date of the 
original deed. Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 273 (Ct. 
App. 1989). the general rule is summarized as follows: 
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Where there is no fraud and the rights of third persons have not 
intervened, and equity could have reformed the deed, it may be 
amended by a subsequent instrument so as to effectuate the 
intention of the parties.... As against third persons an alleged 
defective deed can be cured only by a bill in equity, and not by a 
confirm'ation assuming to relate back to the original deed .... 
Sartain at 273. 
A correction deed does not bestow new title on the grantee; rather, it is the 
confirmation of a title already possessed. Id. As a predicate to operation of this 
doctrine, the parties executing a correction deed must do so in the absence of 
fraud, and where a third party has not intervened. Id. 
In this case, the only stated purpose for filing the warranty deed from The 
Wallace Family Trust in 2010 was to correct the cloud on title created by the trial 
court in its 2006 Judgment. No consideration exchanged hands for the 
correction deed. The clear intent of The Wallace Family Trust was to correct any 
possible cloud on title caused by the trial court's 2006 Judgment. Ex. 49, p. 144. 
The granter had the authority to correct the deed. Global lacked standing to 
object to the correction deed. 
The issue whether to quiet title to 24th Street was never presented 
properly to the trial court because the issue was moot. The trial court neither 
approved nor denied Global's request to quiet title. The 2006 Judgment may 
have been a voidable judgment, but it has never been voided or set aside 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
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6. The Encroachment Should be Treated Differently from the Cloud on Title. 
The encroachment existed prior to 2006. The ejectment cause of action 
seeks to relocate the encroaching portion of Global's facilities back onto Lot 4 as 
set forth in the PCS Site Agreement. Only Sherman or its predecessor in interest 
(as the owner of the east half of 24th Street) has standing to bring the ejectment 
cause of action. The cloud on title does not limit the ejectment claims to 2010 
forward. Otherwise, Sherman would have lacked standing to file its Complaint 
and Amended Complaint. However, in 2006, Sherman assumed all indicia of 
ownership of 24th Street, and no party with standing objected to its continued 
ownership until the trial court's decision in 2010 that stated the 2006 Judgment 
had "questionable value". R., p. 799. 
7. The Existence of a Cloud on Title does not Change the Equities of the 
Parties. 
Regardless of when clear title is determined, equity should not protect 
Global. The trial court's finding of fact number nine stated: "Since June 10, 
2010, when Snerman obtain fee simple title to Lot 4, the eastern half of formerly 
24th Street, and the Cell Tower Site, Sherman accepted Global's rental 
payments." R., p.1336. The trial court confused the purchase of Lot 4 and 24th 
Street. 
The purchase of Lot 4 made Sherman the landlord of the cell tower lease. 
Sherman purchased Lot 4 in 2010 in an arms length transaction. That purchase 
placed Sherman in contractual privity with Global and the PCS Site Agreement. 
Becoming a party to that lease should not change the equities regarding the 
ejectment cause of action concerning 24th Street. The trial court failed to set 
REPLY BRIEF -6 
forth how Sherman's actual knowledge of the encroachment would change the 
equitable determination that ejectment was proper and that Global did not have 
unclean hands in its recording since 2001. After the filing of the correction deed, 
the trial court .never actually addressed the motion to quiet title. It stated in its 
Decision on Summary Judgment 
"Question: Who owns the real property upon which the leased equipment 
is situated? 
Answer. That depends. When the lease was entered into in 1996 the 
property was owned by The Wallace Family Trust. While Sherman 
believes they acquired the property in 2006 by quiet title this court 
concludes otherwise. As of May 2010 Sherman Storage owns the 
property." (emphasis added) R., p. 800. 
This language ("that depends.") was referred to in a footnote by the trial court in 
its final Decision regarding court trial. R., p. 1336. However, the effect of the 
statement is unclear. 
The effect of the cloud on title in the trial court's analysis was never made 
clear. At the beginning of the trial, the trial court made a ruling on Global's 
Motion in Liniine. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 5-11. The court orally made an Order in 
Limine that Sherman acquired title to the east half of 24th Street in June 2010. 
That order was as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, it - - well, without ruling on the 
~elevance at this point, it may or may not have any critical 
relevance on the issue that we have to determine. But it is 
pretty clear that the Court made that determination earlier. 
And, again, I'm not even sure it's a necessary subject for the 
motion in limine, but I think the Court can certainly clarify that 
by granting that motion. I don't think that's really in dispute. 
To the extent that it has any ultimate relevance, I don't know 
that I need to rule on that in this motion, but I think just to 
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factually clarify what the Court has done, I think that's fair. 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 11, I. 12-23. 
However, despite that ruling, many trial exhibits were admitted into 
evidence by stipulation before the trial commenced. Therefore, the order in 
limine did not significantly limit the presentation or admissibility of evidence. It 
would be clearly erroneous if the trial court, pursuant to its order in limine, 
disregarded properly admitted exhibits without advising the parties. 
Sherman asserted in its Appellant's Brief filed herein that it had purchased 
the property in 2006 as opposed to 2010. Appellant's Brief, p. 40. That is still 
true with regard to the ejectment claim, and the equitable defenses to ejectment. 
The cloud on title should not mean the trial court ignores the actions and equities 
of the parties ~p to the year 2010 or that Sherman's knowledge blots out Global's 
encroachment. The trial court should have examined the relative equities of The 
Wallace Family Trust and Sprint/Global prior to 2010. 
8. The Trial Court Erred that the Encroachment was an Immaterial Breach. 
The trial court,stated: 
" ... when Sherman took title to Lot 4, the eastern half of formerly 24th 
Street, and the Cell Tower Site, Sherman knew of the agreements and the 
location of the Cell Tower Site. Sherman took title to the property subject 
to the PCS Site Agreement and the subsequent agreements anyway, and 
began excepting rental payments. Thus, Sherman knew of the breach and 
the remedial measures taken by SSLP and Global since 1996. Sherman 
cannot now claim that the immaterial breach was not remedied at the time 
it took title to the property. This Court, then, finds in favor of Global and 
concludes that no material breach occurred, and rescission is not 
available as a remedy to Sherman." R., p. 1339. 
The trial court's reasoning is flawed. The trial court erred in transforming 
the encroachment into an immaterial breach based in part on the cloud on title 
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which was unknown to Sherman in May of 2006. The trial court confused 
Sherman's purchase of Lot 4 with the acquisition of 24th Street. The owner of 
24th Street cannot claim a breach of the PCS Site Agreement because the owner 
of 24th · Street does not have contractual privity. The lease agreement only 
concerns Lot 4. Only the owner of Lot 4 has standing to seek rescission of the 
lease agreement. Therefore, whether or not there was a cloud on title on 24th 
Street is irrelevant to the breach of contract analysis. In 2010, Sherman 
purchased Lot 4, and all the rights, duties, and obligations of the PCS Site 
Agreement were transferred to Sherman upon the purchase. 
9. Sherman was Compelled to Pay a Portion of the Judgment. 
After trial and the eventual entry of the trial court's final judgment in this 
matter, Sherman paid only the attorneys fees and costs portion of the judgment 
to prevent garnishment, or other execution of the judgment on Sherman's 
assets. 
The Amended Final Judgment in this case was entered on April 18, 2013. 
R., p. 1575. On May 17, 2013, Global filed a motion for bank garnishment and 
issuance of Writ of Execution. R., p. 23. On May 24, 2013, the Court issued 
the Order for Bank Garnishment and Writ of Execution in the amount of 
$260,743.81. R., p. 23. Sherman and its attorney of record were not notified of 
the motion and resulting Order for Garnishment, it being filed ex parte. 
Sherman filed its Notice of Appeal on May 28, 2013. R., p. 24. Only after 
filing the present appeal did Sherman become aware of Global's attempts to 
execute on the Judgment. In order to stop the imminent execution on the 
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Judgment, Sherman researched obtaining a bond. When the bond was 
unworkable, and garnishment still pending, Sherman chose to pay the judgment 
amount pending the appeal. R., p. 1616. 
Sherman did not withdraw or intend to withdraw its appeal on the award of 
the attorney's· fees and the resulting Judgment. The award of attorney's fees 
was included as an issue for appeal in Appellant's Brief. However, Sherman was 
under a compulsion to pay the debt or suffer a large garnishment or other 
execution which would disrupt Sherman's normal business practices. Sherman's 
paying the judgment under these circumstances constitutes an involuntary 
payment to prevent the execution on its property. That element of compulsion 
keeps Sherman's appeal ripe. IBM Corporation, v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 196-
7 (Ct.App.1984) 0udgment satisfied to prevent a scheduled execution on the 
property of judgment debtor creating element of compulsion); Falls Creek timber 
Co., v. Day, 39 Idaho 495, 497 (1924); Power County, Idaho v. Evans Brother 
Land & Llivestock Company, 43 Idaho 158, 165 (1926) (inability to provide 
supersedes bond or election to stand upon appeal and sue for conversion keeps 
appeal ripe). 
10. Sherman Should be Awarded it's Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
In the event Sherman prevails on any issue in this appeal or the Court 
remands the case, Global's award of attorneys fees and costs should be 
reversed, and Sherman should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs at trial 
and on appeal, pursuant to the parties' written contract, the PCS Site Agreement, 
paragraph 15(f), Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54, and I.AR. 41. 
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DATED this +day of July, 2014. 
E 
Attorney for Appellant 
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